Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Murray First Thrift and Loan Company v. John V.
Benson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Romney, Nelson, and Cassity; Donn E. Cassity; Attorneys for Respondent.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall, and McCarthy; Ricardo B. Ferrari; John A. Snow; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Murray First Thrift and Loan Company v. Benson, No. 14684.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1568

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN V. BENSON and EMILY SUE
BENSON,
Defendants,
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
a corporation,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
GEORGE P. RUFF,
Third-Party
Defendant.

Case No. 5380^

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO,

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
of the
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY
Ricardo B. Ferrari, Esq.
John A. Snow, Esq.
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
Donn E. Cassity, Esq.
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Appellant

Fl

Attorneys for Respondent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

OCT 1 2 1976

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN V. BENSON and EMILY SUE
BENSON,
Defendants,
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
a corporation,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
GEORGE P. RUFF,
Third-Party
Defendant.

Case No. 5380

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO.

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
of the
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY
Ricardo B. Ferrari, Esq.
John A. Snow, Esq.
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
Donn E. Cassity, Esq.
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

ARGUMENT

6
THE COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM

10
Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:

(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereo f.
(1) By PriTntxTT; By Stipulation."" SuFJ e c t
to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and
of any applicable statute, an action may be d ismissed by the plaintiff without order of cour t (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time b efore
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filin g a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all partie s who
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwis e
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulat ion,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except th at
a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of the United Sta tes
or of any state an action.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided
in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule,
an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper.
. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
prior to the service upon him of. the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph
is without prejudice. . . .
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MURRAY FIRST THRIFT &. LOAN
CO. , a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)
)

JOHN V. BENSON and EMILY SUE
BENSON,
Defendants,
and

)
/

)
)

MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN
CO. , a corporation,
Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No,

)
)
)
)
)

GEORGE P. RUFF,

)

Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO,
STATEMENT. OF THE CASE.
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. (hereinafter "Murr'.u *")
is the plaintiff in this action.

Plaintiff brought suit aga'.ist

John V. and Emily Sue Benson, his wife, (hereinafter sometimes
l!

Bensonsn) to collect on various notes and foreclose on various

mortgages given by defendants Benson to Murray, a lending
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institution.

(Third-party defendant George P. Ruff [hereinafter

"Ruff"] was the Murray loan officer who had processed the Benson
loans which gave rise to the action.)
Defendants Benson, by their Answer and Amended Answer
(R. 125-138), alleged that certain of the transactions by which
Ruff had disbursed Murray's funds were not represented by notes,
or other evidence of indebtedness and, therefore, were unenforceable and that Ruff had failed to credit payments made on the
loans to BensonsT account.

Defendants further made general

denials of indebtedness to Murray, which denials, according to
Bensons1 counsel's opening statement, were based upon the above
lack of documentation, forgeries by Ruff and fraudulent inducement of the contracts of indebtedness.
1976 Proceedings, 13-14.

Transcript of March 9,

Defendants also filed a Counterclaim

and Amended Counterclaim, seeking to recover damages from
Murray for fraud, misappropriation of funds and forgery, all
allegedly perpetrated by Ruff.

R. 133-135, 131-137.

Subsequent to the Counterclaim1s filing, Murray filed
a three-count Third-Party Complaint against Ruff, seeking
indemnification of any judgment which Bensons might obtain against
Murray on their Counterclaim and Amended Counterclaim, seeking
the principal amount of, and interest on, any sums, disbursed
to the Bensons wh:,h Murray might be unable to recover as a
result of Ruff's failure to discharge and fulfill his duties as
a loan officer (i.e., failure to obtain sufficient collateral
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from Bensons, failure to obtain duly executed promissory
notes from Bensons and failure properly to keep accurate
records and accounts for sums disbursed by Murray to Bensons
and payments received from Bensons), and for wrongful conversion
to his own use of funds disbursed for Bensons.

R. 139-144.

Murray's Complaint alleged - and, by the time of
trial, there was no dispute on this point - that Ruff, as a loan
officer of Murray's, had caused his employer to disburse more
than One Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Dollars ($176,000.00), in
seventeen transactions, ostensibly for loans to John and Emily
Benson.

None of that principal, or interest accruing thereon

after February, 1974, had been repaid to Murray.

R. 1-28.

As to the seventeen transactions in which those funds had been
disbursed, only two conclusions were possible:

That Bensons

legally were indebted to Murray or that the funds had been
disbursed without indebtedness by Bensons attaching, because
Ruff either had forged loan documents, diverted funds issued
for the Bensons for other purposes, failed to prepare loan
documents, or fraudulently had induced Bensons to take out the
loans in the first place.

If the latter were true, Ruff was

liable to Murray for loss of its funds.

Further, if Ruff, in

disregard of his duties, had fai\?.d to secure proper collateral
for the indebtedness and the indebtedness therefore was uncollectable, he similarly was liable to his employer for his

-3-
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misconduct.

If Murray were made whole - either by voluntary

payment by Bensons or by enforcement of a judgment - Murray
would be unable to recover additionally from Ruff on its ThirdParty Complaint.

<

Murray's third-party claim, therefore", supple-

mented its claim against the Bensons and the claim could not
be evaluated divorced from Murrayfs claims against Bensons.

"~

(

Bensons1 indebtedness, which Murray asserted, was
secured by mortgages on certain real property, an apartment
complex in St. George, Utah (which, incidentally, represented
the great majority of Bensons1 total assets).

d

R. 116-124.

The case was set for trial in the District. Court of Washington
County, March 9, 1976.

During a recess, after, the opening

i

statements and before presentation of evidence, Bensons
offered to settle Murray1s claims against them and to dismiss
their counterclaims against Murray, by transferring their
St. George property to plaintiff.
ment.

R. 30-33.

i

Murray accepted that settle-

Of course, at the moment of settlement (liter-

ally minutes before evidence would have been presented to a jury),

i

Murray had no way of knowing to what extent it could recover •
its losses by liquidation of the Benson property.

Murray's

settlement with Bensons was announced to the Court and tl*e
Court ordered dismissal both of Murray's Amended Complaint and
Bensons1 Counterclaim and Amended Counterclaim.
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R, 35.

t

Murray moved the Court that Counts II and III of
its Third-Party Complaint ~- be dismissed without prejudice,
on the ground that Murray "will not know until we have liquidated the Benson property, whether and to what extent Murray
has been injured by the apparent defalcation of Mr. Ruff".
March 9, 1976 Proceedings, p. 33. As Murray's counsel stated .-•
to the Court:

"We have now, through this settlement, obtained,

or will obtain, title to real property of indeterminate value.
It is quite possible that the liquidation of this property
will leave us without damages ... ." Therefore, Murray contended, it was impossible, to go forward with a claim against
Ruff at that time. March 9, 1976 Proceedings, p. 34.
In response to plaintiff's motion for dismissal
without prejudice, Ruff's counsel urged, "I have almost unbelievable expenses because of the complications that detail,
which the Court hasn't been subject to [?], unfortunately, as
of this moment11 and resisted dismissal without prejudice.
Counsel appeared to move that the Third-Party Complaint be
dismissed with prejudice.

-~/ By Cou-f: II, Murray sought to recover'the losses which it
had incurred by reason of Ruff's failure properly to. collateralize the Bensons' loans, to obtain proper promissory
notes and/or to keep accurate records of disbursements; by
Count III, Murray sought to recover funds which it had disbursed, but which had not been received by Bensons.

-5-
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The Court thereupon ordered:

"the third-party suit

against the defendant George Ruff, dismissed with prejudice
.. . ."

Id^, 35.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
Although dirvassal without prejudice after service

of an answer is discretionary with the Court, by the terms of
UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2), that discretion is not absolute.
The Court: of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the
purpose of FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2)-- which is identical to
the Utah rule —

!f

is primarily to prevent voluntary dismissals

which unfairly affect the other side, and to permit the imposition of curative conditions.t!

Durham v. Florida E. C. Ry.

Co.,385 F.2d 336, 368 (5th Cir. 1967).

See also, Alamance

Ind. v. Filene's, Inc., 291 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1961).
The presentation of evidence in the above case had
not begun at the time of plaintiff's motion.

Expenditures in

coming to St. George for trial were an accomplished fact by
the time plaintiff moved for dismissal without prejudice.

The

only inconvenience which plaintiff could have suffered by
dismissal without prejudice would have been the prospect of
the litigation continuing through a new lawsuit, if plaintiff
could not be made whole by its settlement with Bensons.
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I:: is

well settled that the mere prospect of a second lawsuit is
insufficient to bar dismissal without prejudice.

Holiday

Queen Land Corp..v, Baker, 498 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1973).
Accord, Goodman v. Gordon, 447 P.2d 230 (Arizona 1968).
The only burden which Ruff's counsel alleged had,
or would have been, imposed upon his client by dismissal
without prejudice would have been the "unbelievable expense"
which Ruff already had incurred.

If Ruff in fact would be

compelled, by the filing of a later action, to spend funds
which could have been avoided by plaintiff proceeding to
trial on March 9, reasonable compensation could have been madea condition of a subsequent filing.

As was held in Selas

Corp.. of America v. Wi;shire Oil Co. of Texas, 75 F.R.D. 3, 8
(E.D. Pa. 1972):
The basic question to be asked in deciding whether
to order dismissal with (rather than without) prejudice is this: will the defendant suffer some injustice which cannot he rectified by the imposition
of terms and conditions on a dismissal without prejudice?
CONCLUSION
There is no Utah case law addressed to the question o
this appeal.

However, the authority of jurisdictions with

identical rules dictates compellingly that the Court has abused
its discretion in this matter.

For the foregoing reasons, the

decision of the Court below should be reversed and the case
remanded for dismissal without prejudice. •••
• •Law
..;
- 7 -J."Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respectfully sul aitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY

/A—-V,
\
'

V.

R i c a r d o B. F e r r a r i
(John A. Snow
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